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I. THE SNOW
Early Monday, January 8, 1996, my wife and I stepped out into
the dazzling sight of Washington, D.C., blanketed in snow. For the
previous thirty hours the city had been swept by a blizzard of propor-
tions unseen since 1922. The news reported all offices in the capital
closed - except for in custody arraignments in the D.C. District Court.
We had planned to hear Supreme Court arguments in Lotus Develop-
ment Corporation v. Borland International, Inc. that day, but we were
confident that we would be looking for something else to do.1 The
quickest way to see whether the Court would be in session was to
check with some of the counsel staying in a neighboring hotel.
* See generally, Jason A. Whong and Andrew T.S. Lee, Lotus v. Borland: Defining the
Limits of Software Copyright Protection, 12 SANTA CLARA CoMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 207.
** Copyright © 1996 Howard C. Anawalt.
t A.B. Stanford University; J.D., University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall). The
author teaches at Santa Clara University and directs the law school's High Technology Program.
The accompanying amicus brief was written by the author and Ms. Carol A. Kunze, an attorney
and active member of the High Technology Advisory Board. Sean Calvert, a second year stu-
dent at Santa Clara University School of Law, provided invaluable legal research and critique of
this essay.
1. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
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As we walked into the coffee shop, I saw Michael Barclay, one of
the Borland attorneys. I asked him in jest, "are you going to court
today?" H6 replied that indeed he was: "the case is on." "You're
pulling my leg!" "No, here's the clerk's number. You can check it
yourself. We have to be there at 8:30 for a briefing." He bolted down
the rest of his muffin and was gone.
Cabs were hopeless, but the Metro was convenient. We soon set
out. The Metro was way behind time, and we managed to get off at
the wrong stop. We set out through huge drifts of snow, beating our
own path part of the way. We reached the base of Capitol Hill (the
Supreme Court is just behind the Capitol) and continued trudging up
the hill. A lonely four-wheel drive sport van drove past us through the
snow. When we saw a second one, we instinctively stuck out our
thumbs. The vehicle stopped, and Senator Dole gave us a ride to the
Court. We arrived with time to spare and proceeded to hear argu-
ments in the Borland case.
I. THE CASE
Briefly, Borland presents a situation where one software devel-
oper, Borland, copied wholesale the command hierarchy of a competi-
tor's popular spreadsheet program, Lotus 1-2-3. Borland did this
copying so that its product could easily be used by people who were
familiar with Lotus 1-2-3. Most of us use computers, and from that
experience, we realize that we make an investment of time when we
buy a new program and start to use it. This is because getting a pro-
gram to do the things we want requires us to use commands built into
the software.
Learning new commands can be wearisome at the very least. So
far in this article I have used commands for centering and aligning text
with the left margin, making bold text, changing size of text, setting
the line spacing, creating italics and footnotes. Even with the simplest
interface, one wants to minimize the need to learn to do the same
functions with new commands.
Often the user will create specialized shortcut commands of his
own. These are called "macros." A macro consists of a sequence of
commands needed to accomplish a task. The macros reduce the effort
called for in using programs, especially for repetitive tasks.
When Borland decided to compete with the Lotus 1-2-3 spread-
sheet, it faced the following reality: Lotus 1-2-3 was very popular.
Many users invested a considerable amount of time creating macros so
that they could make their work easier. If Borland created a superior
program, it would benefit users and gain an opportunity for a profita-
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ble share of the spreadsheet market. Borland would have to do its
own work in creating the program, as copyright laws fully protect the
code already authored by Lotus. So, the company designed and wrote
its own spreadsheet program. But there was a catch, users were al-
ready familiar with Lotus 1-2-3 commands. Furthermore, those who
had created macros would be extremely reluctant to shift to any new
program that would force them to abandon their hard work put into
making macros. To meet this objection, Borland had to create a copy
of the Lotus 1-2-3 command hierarchy within its program. Otherwise,
users could not use their macros created for Lotus 1-2-3.2
After a lengthy trial, the Federal District Court found that Bor-
land had infringed Lotus' copyright by duplicating the command hier-
archy.3 Borland appealed to the First Circuit, which ruled that while
indeed there had been copying, what had been copied constituted a
"method of operation" which can not be copyrighted because of the
limitations imposed by 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).4 The Supreme Court
promptly granted certiorari, including briefing on an expedited sched-
ule. The stage was set for what promised to be one of the most influ-
ential decisions ever on software copyright. In order to understand the
significance of the case, we next examine the problem of copyright in
the context of software.
III. SoFrwARE COPYRIGHT
For close to two decades the legislatures and courts have tussled
with the problem of how to handle claims of ownership or control of
computer programs. Both copyright and patent law have been used
with varying degrees of practical success to protect the valuable work
product of software innovators. Trade secret has always been avail-
able as a means of protecting new software developments, provided
true secrecy is maintained. Contracts also provide formidable means
of protecting software developments. Our focus here, however, is on
software copyrights, with a brief comparison with the treatment of
software under patent law.
Starting in the early 1980s, copyright moved with great speed to
become a reliable means of protecting authorship of software. The
2. "Because the set of instructions used by the macro is a subset of Lotus' commands, the
Borland platform had to translate those instructions from macros by means of a file that exactly
replicated the Lotus 1-2-3 command structure's syntax and semantics." Brief for the American
Committee for Interoperable Systems (ACIS) at 17, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116
S. Ct. 804 (1996).
3. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F.Supp. 203, 223 (D. Mass. 1992).
4. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995).
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copyright march began with video game cases.5 It then moved swiftly
to allow copyright ownership of operating systems, that is, those pro-
grams that function as the central nervous systems of personal com-
puters and workstations.6
A high watermark for copyright protection was reached in Whe-
lan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., a Third Circuit
case, that sanctioned copyright ownership of the basic structure and
file organization of a dental office management program.7 The import
of the case was that one could now claim ownership of the building
blocks or basic processes for handling matters by way of computer
programming. The first writer of a program structure would secure
copyright ownership, so long as a competitor could set forth his or her
code (express it) in a different structure or organization.8
In 1991, the Whelan case approach was successfully challenged
by the Second Circuit in Computer Associates International, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc.9 The Altai case squarely rejected Whelan because it al-
lowed one to own far too much. Programmers necessarily operate
within a practical environment that constrains them to do things effi-
ciently, which may entail using a basic organization that they may
have seen some other fellow use. 10 A sound copyright approach
would require that a variety of external or objective aspects be denied
copyright protection. Thus, the courts should filter out structural ele-
ments dictated by considerations of efficiency and the like.I The in-
5. See Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
6. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464
U.S. 1033 (1984). The protection has extended to such matters as microcode and interfaces
between the human user and the computer running the programs, as well. See, e.g., NEC Corp.
v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
7. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
8. 797 F.2d at 1236 n.28.
9. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
10. Copyright violation consists primarily of copying another's work. If a programmer has
had access to another's work, then one can easily infer that if that same programmer's work is
"substantially similar" to the first work, then there has been copying, hence a violation. In.
dependent creation does not violate copyright. E.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d
44 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986).
11. The court in Altai adopted Professor Nimmer's three-step approach to determining
what expression is copyrightable. The first filter separates out those expressions where there is
only one way to express the idea. The expression and the idea are inseparable and "merge,"
denying any copyright protection to the expression. The second filter separates out those expres-
sions which are dictated by factors external to the expression itself. These expressions would be
those required given the particular idea sought to be expressed, commonly referred to as scenes a
faire. The third filter sifts out those expressions which are included in the public domain. For all
expressions separated out through the filtration process copyright is no bar to copying that ex-
pression. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706-11 (2d Cir. 1992).
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fluence of Altai spread rapidly and is now followed in a number of
other circuits."z While copyright law follows the interpretation of
each circuit, one can nevertheless observe that the Altai approach or
some variant predominates in the United States today.
At issue in these cases was the scope of copyright protection. It
is generally accepted that copyright extends to computer programs,13
yet a bedeviling question lies at the heart of cases such as Whelan and
Altai: How far does copyright protection extend? The debate contin-
ues and promises to extend long into the future.
While the Supreme Court had not ventured into the fray prior to
Borland,4 it has warned in recent years that copyright control should
not extend too broadly in the face of public interests in access to and
use of expressed thought. In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tele-
phone Service Co., Inc., 5 the Court rejected a claim of copyright own-
ership of the organization and contents of white pages in a telephone
book on constitutional grounds. However, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 6 the Court affirmed the existence of a broad privilege to
parody or transform copyrighted works under the statutory rubric of
fair use.
The Altai line of cases, together with the Supreme Court's gen-
eral copyright rulings has signaled a relative retrenchment in the scope
of copyright software protection.
Let us briefly consider the protection accorded software pro-
grams by patent law. At first, patent law appeared to be sharply cur-
tailed as a viable means of protecting computer software. 17 However,
Gottschalk did not flatly reject software patents. Several later
Supreme Court decisions actually stated that so long as a computer-
ized process either controlled a physical operation or changed a state
of matter, then patents could be obtained for software processes, if the
statutory requirements of novelty, utility, and nonobviousness were
12. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 1176 (1995) (related issue of protection of graphical interfaces); Gates Rubber
Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 1993); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F. 2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
13. As stated in the ACIS brief, the notion that copyright protects computer programs,
including nonliteral elements of their expression "is non-controversial and has been readily ac-
cepted by other courts." Brief for the American Committee for Interoperable Systems (ACIS) at
17, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804 (No. 94-2003).
14. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
15. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
16. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 1164 (1994). The fair use privilege is
set forth in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988 & supp. 1993).
17. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
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satisfied."i A raft of Court of Claims and Patent Appeals, then Fed-
eral Circuit cases confirmed the strong viability of software patents. 19
A quick summary of the trends on software protection yields the
following observation. Copyright protection remains important and
ubiquitous, but its scope has begun to recede toward boundaries which
comport more with the traditional nature of copyright. After all copy-
right grants an enormous time of ownership for rather elusive products
of the mind, namely, particular expressions of ideas.
Patent software protection, on the other hand, has burgeoned in
recent years to allow registration of virtually any software invention
that in any way changes states of matter, governs processes, or sifts
such physical phenomena as signals.20 Patent law specifically pro-
vides for ownership of new "processes" for a statutory period of
twenty years.2' Applications for software patents have increased
enormously, and general acceptance of the applications by the Patent
Office appears to be growing. 22
IV. A QUIET STATUTE
From the outset, the Copyright Act has sought to balance a privi-
lege to control one's creative and expressive output against the pub-
lic's right of access to the underlying ideas.23 In order to assure public
access to ideas and unpatented utilitarian processes, Congress included
§ 102(b) as part of the basic provisions of the 1976 Copyright Act.
The section is sweeping in its exclusion of matters that consist of pure
idea or primarily utilitarian function. It states:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of author-
ship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of op-
eration, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in the
work.24
18. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (1988). See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v.
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). See also Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
19. The best single case for reference on this progression and the current contours is Ar-
rhythmia Research Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
20. See id.; In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed.Cir. 1994).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 154. The Copyright Act equally clearly rejects copyright of processes. 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
22. Request for Comments on Proposed Examination Guidelines for Computer-Imple-
mented Inventions, 60 Fed. Reg. 28,778 (1995).
23. The discussion refers to the current Copyright Act, which was enacted in 1976. The
same effort has been present in the prior statutes, such as the 1909 Copyright Act. See Brief
Amicus Curiae of Copyright Law Professors, Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct.
804 (1996) (No. 94-2003).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (emphasis added).
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Since its inception the 102(b) exclusion has played a relatively
minor role in computer software litigation. This is particularly sur-
prising since these works, while "literary" in form or expression, are
fundamentally functional. Software programs are employed to accom-
plish a specific task,' not for their "expression."
In 1995, however, § 102(b) took center stage in the First Circuit
which allowed Borland to incorporate a copy of the entire command
hierarchy from Lotus' 1-2-3 spreadsheet program in its competing
Quattro Pro program without violating Lotus' copyright. An exact
copy was permitted, because the Circuit Court reasoned that it consti-
tuted a "method of operation," which is excluded from copyright pro-
tection under § 102(b).26
V. THE ARGUMENT
Supreme Court oral arguments are extremely important. While
the cases before the court have already been fully briefed, the argu-
ment offers the chance for counsel to engage the Court in a fast mov-
ing dialogue about the issues. The Court often engages in the
arguments which flow like a conversation, albeit one constrained by
the authority of the Justices and the confines of the client's interests at
issue.
Mr. Henry B. Gutman, counsel for Lotus, began by emphasizing
that the First Circuit had gone too far in its ruling. He urged that since
the trial court had made no explicit finding that expressive choices had
been completely absorbed into the basic idea structure of the menu,
the case must be reversed.27 Mr. Gary Reebak, counsel for Borland,
attempted to steer the argument toward what would be equitable under
the Copyright Act.
As important as oral arguments can be, it is nearly impossible to
draw firm conclusions from what one hears during the course of them.
This is because the arguments are an inquiry, that is, an opportunity
for the Justices to explore. For instance, were I a judge, I would want
to know counsel's response to hard questions, especially if I had a
preliminary view on how I believed the case should be decided. One
25. See the brief discussion of software as process versus software as expression in Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
26. Lotus v. Borland, 49 F.3d 807, 815-16.
27. Mr. Gutman actually argued this point in terms of art that have developed under copy-
right law. If particular expression of something coincides so fully with the underlying concept
embodied in the expression, then the two can be said to have "merged," and is not protectable.
See, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967); CCC Infor-
mation Servs., Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, Inc., 44 F.3d 61 (2nd Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 72 (1995).
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way to test an initial inclination would be to ask a pointed question
that seemed to be "loaded" with a point of view that is quite contrary
to my actual leanings. Such a question would permit me to see how
counsel reasons the response, exposing the strengths or weaknesses of
a view that is quite different from my present thinking. After all, I
would want to act on the case in a thoughtful and well informed
manner.
28
With that caveat in mind, I did note the following themes in the
argument.
A. Expression
A cornerstone concept in a copyright case is whether the work at
hand contains expressive matter that ought to be protected. In the
Borland case, Justice O'Connor noted that Borland had copied the en-
tire 469 words that constituted the menu hierarchy. Her questions and
observations along this line seemed to indicate that the answer must be
in some sense "yes," some of the hierarchy is expressive. If that is the
case, then Lotus should win, according to an analysis based on the
notion that all original expression can be protected under copyright.
Justice Ginsburg pursued the same theme. She wondered aloud if
this case were not too sweeping. Had there ever been a case where an
entire range of works had been excluded from copyright protection,
without regard to the fact that they may contain expressive aspects?
Her line of questioning raises different possibilities concerning the in-
terpretation of § 102. Section 102(b) can be understood in at least one
of the following ways: (1) Section 102(b) constitutes an aid to finding
whether something is "expressive." To the extent a menu hierarchy is
a method, it is likely not to be an expressive feature; or (2) Section
102(b) creates an affirmative bar to copyright. Even if a portion of a
menu is "expressive," if that same aspect amounts to a function or
method, it is excluded from copyright.29
28. Journalists will often assure us that Justice X is going a certain direction because she
asked such and such a question or employed a certain tone when asking it. Sometimes that is so.
Sometimes it is not. Often the journalist's interpretation of "where the Justice is coming from"
falls very wide of the mark. In addition, the observer will be necessarily limited in perceptions
and recollection. I took no notes during the argument, I am not sure whether note taking is
permitted in the bar section of the court. In any case, I did not want to be distracted from the
overall ambience of the argument.
29. The two different approaches resemble the way in which a typical tort case is viewed.
The plaintiff must prove his or her case. While the defendant may undermine the case in chief,
he or she may also present affirmative defenses. The first version makes § 102(b) part of the
case in chief. The second makes it an affirmative defense.
[Vol. 12
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Justice Breyer offered an analogy to the menu hierarchy.3" The
analogy was that someone designed a very good organization for a
department store: women's wear on the first floor, men's on the sec-
ond, children's on the third, etc. The organization then has formal
wear in one section, business suits in another, right on down to shirts,
sweaters, etc. He wanted to know whether one could copyright such
an organization, including the labels, "women's," "shirts," etc. He
pressed both counsel with this line of questions. He seemed to lean
toward finding such matters, including the Lotus menu hierarchy, ex-
cluded from copyright.
Very early in Mr. Gutman's argument, Justice Souter asked
whether this was an "analysis" or a "choice" case.31 Mr. Gutman re-
sponded without hesitation - he stated that it was an analysis case. He
then continued with his theme that the First Circuit made a critical
mistake by ruling as a matter of law against Lotus where the trial court
had made-no explicit finding that the expressive elements of the menu
had "merged" with and therefore become inseparable from the idea. If
this is the case, then the Circuit Court failed to leave the crucial fac-
tual question to the trial court.
B. Macros, Judge Boudin, and Policy
Another main feature of the argument was whether a policy
choice exists. The concurring opinion of Judge Boudin came up quite
a number of times in this context, as he had indicated that an inappro-
priate creation of a monopoly would result, if control of the macros
were allowed.32 One response to this line of inquiry would be to em-
phasize that Congress has firmly identified the controlling policy in
§ 102(b). The Act has struck this balance in favor of users, by forbid-
ding ownership of methods.
The question of the meaning of § 102(b) as a policy limit (also as
a firm rule) was made rather concrete in a colloquy by Judge Boudin
that focused on the development and use of macros. If it is true that
30. He also stated, in a light hearted way, that "no one likes" the analogy. Lotus Dev.
Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 1996 WL 12827, at 15 (U.S. Oral.Arg., Jan. 8, 1996).
31. 1 believe Justice Souter used the word "choice" A colleague thought that was the
word, as well. In any case, "analysis" and "choice" reflect the sense of his comparison. I
thought that was one of the most trenchant questions asked during the argument, yet I am not
certain what Justice Souter was probing with it. He may have meant that an analytical case
would be one which simply asks whether the lower court followed the correct application of the
statute, as in its handling of the problem of "merger" of idea and expression. By "choice," he
may have been asking if the case is one in which choice among either policies or major premises
would determine the outcome. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 1996 WL 12827, at 6
(U.S. Oral.Arg., Jan. 8, 1996).
32. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 821 (1st Cir. 1995).
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the original developer, in this case Lotus, can in effect control the use
of shortcuts developed and "expressed" by the user, then the basic
policy of ownership only of one's own expression will be violated.
VI. LULL IN THE STORM
The decision in Borland came as swiftly as the Blizzard of '96.
Eight days after the oral argument, the Courtissued a one sentence per
curiam opinion: "The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit is affirmed by an equally divided Court."33 The
speed of the decision took close watchers of this case by complete
surprise.
The ruling brings finality to the specific case, absent the rare pos-
sibility of a grant of a rehearing.34 However, the Supreme Court deci-
sion itself has no effect as precedent.35 Thus, the decision falls far
short of being "definitive" regarding the effect of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)
as a limitation on the scope of copyright. The First Circuit will be
guided by both the holding and the general understanding conveyed
by the Court of Appeals decision.36
However, the disposition creates doubt over the relative force of
some basic copyright premises - whether developer or public access
claims ought to prevail with regard to highly functional elements of a
computer application. Four Justices voted to affirm, but four were of
some other opinion, to reverse, or perhaps remand.
Thus, the decision represents a lull in the storm that gathers
around the Supreme Court concerning the scope of copyright protec-
tion of software. The clouds of controversy now hover outside Wash-
ington, in various District and Circuit Court cases. More parties with
adequate financial resources will be inclined to seek review of their
computer copyright claims. Their counsel will be emboldened by the
close division within the Court.
There are matters which remain relatively certain, however, de-
spite the lack of a definitive ruling in this case. First of all, § 102(b)
33. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996). The order further notes:
"Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case."
34. Lotus would have to petition within 25 days. The Stem and Gressman treatise noted
only two rehearings granted in the 1991 and 1992 terms. R. SmTM Er AL., SuPnrEMt CouRr
PRAcricE 610, 620 (7th ed. 1993).
35. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
36. Other circuits would not be bound by the First Circuit's ruling, absent a pronounce-
ment by the Supreme Court. While there is no Borland Supreme Court decision to interpret, the
proceedings before the Court may be helpful to attorneys in future cases. Stem and Gressman
suggest: "Indeed, it would seem appropriate to look at anything in the earlier record, briefs, or
argument that may reasonably be regarded as throwing light on what the summary affirmance
means." Sra'mET AL., supra note 34, at 219.
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remains a strong and definite limitation on the scope of copyright
computer claims. Computer programs behave, function, and while our
law has been designed to protect the literary expression of that func-
tionality, it has also created the strong line of resistance embodied in
§ 102(b).
When pressed by a judge as to whether public policy favors
copyright control or public access to necessary command functions,
the strongest response is that Congress has already struck the balance
and decided the governing policy by its implementation of § 102(b).
Functionality which is nearly pure, that is not embellished by some
element of creative choice falls outside copyright protection. To be
sure, the line between expression and unadorned functionality is not
bright. But the Copyright Act insists that judges draw the line, and
that they draw it with vigor in order to assure that the public will enjoy
the "Progress of Science and the useful Arts" as Congress intended.31
Carol Kunze and I are publishing our amicus brief that accompa-
nies this essay because we are confident that it properly emphasizes
the thrust and practical importance of § 102(b).38 Section 102(b)
presents an integrated set of concepts that exclude ideas and primarily
functional works. Copyright does not extend to those aspects of a
computer interface which constitute the command function.
The Borland case has come and gone, but §102(b) should cer-
tainly move to a more prominent role in copyright treatment of com-
37. U.S. CONsT. art. I § 8, cl. 8.
38. I had been working with and advising on the basis of § 102(b) for years. Many stu-
dents in my classes had worked through its implications, and that activity accelerated after the
Circuit Court decision was announced. I joined in the "Copyright Professor's Amicus Brief'
written principally by Pamela Samuelson in the First Circuit. After all these years, I truly wanted
to submit a very short brief to the highest court that focused sharply on the meaning and impact
of § 102(b). Over the years I have had the benefit of working with many fine copyright scholars,
including the following who also provided critique and reassurance on our Amicus brief: Mr.
Daniel B. Curtis, Professor Pamela Samuelson, Professor Paul Goldstein, and Professor Dennis
Katjala. Also, I believe that intellectual property claims are always subject to very strong public
policy claims of access. These are based on norms of freedom of competition and free flow of
information. Title 17 § 102(b) appears to be an example of congressional recognition of access
type rights.
I was also asked: "What if Lotus had won?" If that had been the case, § 102(b) and its
attendant policies would still be on the books, but depending on the nature of the Supreme
Court's discussion, a cloud might have been placed over the efficacy of the provision. However,
the most likely Supreme Court decision, other than affirmance, would have taken some form of
clear recognition of the force of § 102(b) coupled with a remand to the lower courts.
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puter programs. 39 The "quiet statute" will speak clearly, though not
shrilly, in software litigation and planning.
39. Recently the Eleventh Circuit utilized § 102(b) to reverse and remand requiring more
adequate jury instructions on matters that may be beyond copyright protection. The Court noted
that a variety of bases, including § 102(b) definitely limit certain functional aspects of software:
"Whether the protection is unavailable because these (external factors such as compatibility
requirements) render the expression unoriginal, or nonexpressive per 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), or
whether these factors compel a finding of fair use, copyright estoppel, or misuse, the result is to
deny copyright protection to portions of the computer program." Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc.,
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 36363 (11th Cir., Dec. 22, 1995).
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